「113 年死刑釋憲案」以犯罪行為人「有無更生教化或再社會化的可能」作為死刑的量刑標準，而如此可能改變的鑑定乃建立在實證方法的使用。本文提出康德倫理學、杜威教育哲學、主流宗教教義等觀點，來論證「人類具有教化可能性」的概念乃屬於價值性、道德性、規範性和理性的概念，以實徵科學方式界定且判斷人的教化可能性犯了範疇錯置的謬誤。本文主張，若將「教化可能性」這一概念重新定位，則「情節最嚴重之罪」與「死刑」的概念都將失去實質意義。最後，本文作者肯定「113 年死刑釋憲案」，認為這釋憲案表現出台灣各界在面對重大社會爭議時，能擺脫政治立場且能依程序正義得出決議。這彰顯了台灣社會的民主與法治精神。

 

關鍵字

113 年死刑釋憲案、教化可能性、死刑、廢死

Taiwan Constitutional Court’s 2024 death penalty ruling (Interpretation No. 113) adopted “the possibility of rehabilitation, moral reformation, or social reintegration” as the decisive standard in sentencing for the death penalty. Such an assessment, however, is grounded in the use of empirical methods. This article, drawing on Kantian ethics, Dewey’s philosophy of education, and mainstream religious doctrines, argues that the concept of human educability belongs to the normative, moral, regulative, and rational domains. To define or determine educability through empirical science is therefore to commit a category mistake. The article further contends that if the concept of “educability” is redefined in its proper sense, then the notions of both “the most serious crimes” and “the death penalty” will lose substantive meaning. Finally, the author affirms the Court’s decision in Interpretation No. 113, recognizing it as evidence that, when faced with major social controversies, Taiwan’s society is capable of transcending partisan positions and reaching decisions in accordance with procedural justice. This demonstrates the democratic and rule-of-law spirit of Taiwanese society.

 

Keywords

Interpretation No. 113, human educability, death penalty, abolition of death penalty